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Abstract
Do central banks respond to exchange rate movements? According to Lubik
and Schorfheide (2007) who estimate structural general equilibrium models with
monetary policy rules, the answer is ”Yes, some do”. However, their analysis is
based on a sample with multiple regime changes, which may bias the results. We
revisit their original question using a Markov switching set up which explicitly al-
lows for parameter changes. Fitting the data from four small open economies to
the model, we find that the size of policy responses, and the volatility of struc-
tural shocks, have not stayed constant during the sample period (1982-2011). In
particular, central banks in Sweden and the UK switched from a high response to
the exchange rate in the 1980s and early 1990s, to a low response some time after
inflation targeting was implemented. Canada also observed a regime change, but
the decline in the exchange rate response was small relative to the increase in the
response to inflation and output. Norway, on the other hand, did not observe a
shift in the policy response over time, as the central bank has stayed in a regime of
high exchange rate response prior and post implementing inflation targeting.
JEL-codes: C68, E52, F41
Keywords: Monetary policy, exchange rates, inflation targeting, markov switching, small
open economy
∗The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of
Norges Bank. The authors would like to thank Sandra Eickmeier and participants at the Computing
in Economics and Finance (CEF) conference in Vancouver in July 2013 and the Monetary Policy and
Commodity Prices Workshop at the ECB in November 2012 for constructive comments.
†Ragna Alstadheim, Norges Bank. Email: Ragna.Alstadheim@norges-bank.no
‡Corresponding author : Hilde C. Bjørnland, BI Norwegian Business School and Norges Bank. Email:
hilde.c.bjornland@bi.no
§Junior Maih, Norges Bank. Email: Junior.Maih@norges-bank.no
1
1 Introduction
Do central banks respond to exchange rate movements? According to Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) who estimate structural general equilibrium models with interest rate rules for
monetary policy in small open economies, the answer is ”Yes some do”. In particular,
they find that the interest rate rules in Canada and the UK include responses to the
nominal exchange rate, in addition to direct responses to the output gap and the in-
flation rate. Corroborating findings have been documented for Canada, New Zealand,
Norway and Sweden in Bjørnland (2009) and Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2013) using struc-
tural vector autoregression (SVAR) models that allow for simultaneous responses between
monetary policy and exchange rate changes.
During the period that Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) analyse (1983 to 2002), many
countries went from having a formal exchange rate target to inflation targeting, either
directly or via a period of informal exchange rate stabilisation (inside a band). Therefore,
their analysis may be based on samples with multiple regime changes. Furthermore,
different policy responses may also imply changes in volatility. In particular, one would
expect that domestic business cycle fluctuations in open economies, especially those that
are rich in natural resources, are likely to have a substantial international relative price
component. Some inflation targeting central banks therefore may, in specific periods,
have a specific interest in explicitly reacting to and smoothing exchange rate movements
as a predictor of domestic volatility. Hence, assuming a time-invariant parameter reaction
function as well as constant volatility during the sample period may bias the results.
Against this background, we analyse the importance of regime changes to the monetary
policy responses and the shocks that hit small open economies. Our main focus is to
explore whether inflation targeting central banks put the same weight on stabilising the
exchange rate throughout the period independent of the known regime changes and the
volatility of shocks. Furthermore, given that we observe a regime change, we analyse
how this may have impacted the responses of output and inflation to structural shocks,
and how the unconditional variances of endogenous variables have changed. A strong or
weak response to the exchange rate may imply larger or smaller volatility of endogenous
variables, depending on the cocktail of disturbance hitting the economy.
To answer these questions, we estimate a small open economy dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model, similar to the one put forward in Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007), using Bayesian methods but allowing for independent Markov switching in the
shocks that hit the economy and in the monetary policy responses.1 The analysis is
applied to four small-open-economy countries: Canada, Norway, Sweden and the UK, all
of which have adopted inflation targeting during the period analysed, 1982 to 2011. Of
these, Canada and the UK were included in the analysis of Lubik and Schorfheide (2007),
while Norway and Sweden are new.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper to address the specific question of regime shifts in the monetary
1The DSGE model put forward in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) is a simplified version of Gal´ı and
Monacelli (2005).
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policy responses and volatility in small open economies. While Liu and Mumtaz (2011)
also analyse regime shifts in the UK using a Markov switching open economy DSGE
model, their focus is more general, analysing shifts in parameters and shocks to the
whole DSGE model. Second, we use new solution algorithms, see Maih (2012). The
algorithms rely on Newton methods developed in Maih (2012) and which extend Farmer
et al. (2011). Third, in contrast to Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) who treat foreign output
and inflation as unobservable (latent) variables, we include foreign (global) output and
inflation explicitly as observables in the model in order to better identify the effects of
foreign shocks. This helps to tie the dynamics of the small open economies model more
explicitly to the global shocks. Finally, unlike Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), we do not
detrend the data prior to the analysis.2 We believe that non-filtered data are important to
let the Markov-switching framework inform about medium-term changes in the dynamics
of the data, which detrending effectively eliminates. Our maintained hypothesis is that
the variables can be stationary but from different distributions reflected by different
regimes.
We have two main findings. First, we find strong evidence that deep structural parameters
and the volatility of structural shocks do not remain constant through the sample period
in any of the four countries. Our results give a more nuanced picture of the weight that
central banks give to stabilizing the nominal exchange rate. In particular, we find that
the central banks in Sweden and the UK put less weight on stabilising the exchange
rate, as measured by the response to the nominal effective exchange rate, when inflation
targeting was adopted in the early 1990s. Canada also observed a regime switch, but a
few years later. The switch implied a decline in the exchange rate response, but only
relative to the increase in response to inflation and output. The change corresponds well
with the time the Bank of Canada abandoned the systematic intervention in the foreign
exchange market. For Norway, which formally adopted inflation targeting as late as 2001,
we do not observe a systematic change in the response to the nominal effective exchange
rate, which has remained high throughout the period analysed.
Second, we show that preceding the switch in policy response, Sweden and the UK in
particular observed several episodes of high volatility, which may have contributed to the
policy switch. During the last 15 years, however, while the periods of high volatility have
been less common, they have also been more synchronised across countries.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the New Key-
nesian model for SOE, while the algorithms and the estimation procedure are described
in Section 3. Data and priors are presented in section 4, and the results are reported in
section 5. Section 6 discusses robustness, and Section 7 concludes.
2 A structural small open economy model
Our model is a simplified version of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) which is adapted from
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).3. The model consist of a forward-looking (open economy)
2Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) detrend the data using the Hodrick- Prescott (HP) filter.
3See also Del Negro and Schorfheide (2009) for a similar exposition.
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IS equation, a Phillips curve, an exchange rate equation and a monetary policy (interest
rate) rule.
Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), we rewrite the (consumption) Euler equation as
an open economy IS-curve:
yt = Etyt+1 − (τ + λ)(rt − Etpit+1)− ρzzt − α(τ + λ)Et∆qt+1 + λ
τ
Et∆y
∗
t+1, (1)
where 0 < α < 1 is the import share (that measures the degree of openness), τ is the
intertemporal substitution elasticity and we define λ = α(2 − α)(1 − τ). Note that the
equation reduces to its closed economy variant when α = 0. The endogenous variables
are output yt, the CPI inflation rate pit and the nominal interest rate rt. qt is the terms of
trade, y∗t is world output, while zt is the growth rate of an underlying non-stationary world
technology process At. In order to obtain stationarity of the model, domestic and foreign
output are both expressed in terms of percentage deviations from At.
4 We will assume
that y∗t and zt are exogenous variables that evolve as AR processes with autoregressive
coefficients ρy∗ and ρz respectively.
Optimal price setting of domestic firms, together with an assumption of perfect risk-
sharing across countries that links domestic potential output to foreign output, leads to
the open economy Phillips curve
pit = βEtpit+1 + αβEt∆qt+1 − α∆qt + κ
(τ + λ)
(yt − y¯t), (2)
where y¯t ≡ −α(2−α)(1− τ)/τy∗t is domestic potential output in the absence of nominal
rigidities. Again this reduces to the closed economy variant with α = 0. In a standard
New-Keynesian model, κ is the slope coefficient. It is related to the price stickiness,
the degree of competition and the representative firm’s cost function parameters. Like
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), we treat κ itself as structural, but we do not model the
underlying structure of the production side of the economy.
Finally, when estimating the model, we add a demand shock εy to the IS equation and a
cost push shock εpi to the Phillips curve.
We introduce the nominal exchange rate (et) via the definition of consumer prices. As-
sume that relative Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) holds, we have:
∆et = pit − (1− α)∆qt − pi∗t , (3)
where pi∗t is world inflation. In our setup, the nominal exchange rate, domestic inflation,
the terms of trade and foreign inflation are observable variables. Of these, the exchange
rate and the domestic inflation rate are endogenous, while the other variables will be
exogenous and follow AR-processes. The restriction underlying the PPP condition is
4This implies that observed domestic and foreign output growth correspond to respectively ∆yt and ∆y
∗
t
adjusted by productivity growth zt.
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therefore quite tight, and we allow for measurement errors in these variables. Since all
variables are demeaned, equation 3 allow for a trend in the real exchange rate.
Monetary policy is described by an interest rate rule where we assume that the central
bank can adjust its instrument in response to inflation, output and possibly also due to
a nominal exchange rate depreciation:
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)(γpipit + γyyt + γe∆et) + r,t, (4)
We assume that the policy coefficients γpi, γy and γe ≥ 0. We also allow for a smoothing
term in the rule, with 0< ρr < 1. r,t is the exogenous monetary policy shock, which can
be interpreted as the unsystematic component of monetary policy (deviation from rule).
With this setup, the policy coefficients γpi, γy, and γe should be interpreted as long-run
responses - with high interest rate persistence, the estimated γ′s may be quite large, and
still entail small immediate responses.
Finally, instead of solving endogenously for terms of trade, we follow Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) and add a law of motion for their growth rate to the system:
∆qt = ρq∆qt−1 + q,t
3 The Markov-Switching DSGE model
In this section, we describe a general framework for the Markov switching DSGE or ratio-
nal expectations model. Then we briefly discuss the solution method and the estimation
approach. All the algorithms used for the computations in this paper are done using
RISE, an object-oriented Matlab toolbox for solving and estimating Markov switching
rational expectations (MSRE) models.5
3.1 The general framework
For a linear model like the one considered in this paper, the general Markov-switching
rational expectations model can be written as 6:
Et
{
A+st+1xt+1 (•, st) + A0stxt (st, st−1) + A−stxt−1 (st−1, st−2) +Bstεt
}
= 0 (5)
xt is a n× 1 vector including all the endogenous (predetermined and non-predetermined)
variables; εt ∼ N (0, I), is the vector of structural shocks. The regime index st, which
could be a composite of states from different Markov chains, switches between a finite
number of possibilities with cardinality h. And so, st = 1, 2, ..., h. (st, st−1) denotes the
state today st and the state in the previous period st−1.
5RISE is the acronym for ”Rationality In Switching Environments”. It is available free of charge at
https://github.com/jmaih/RISE_toolbox and is being developed by Junior Maih.
6See Maih(2012) for the general nonlinear case.
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The Markov transition probabilities are summarized by a matrix Q = [pst,st+1 ], where
pst,st+1 = prob(st+1|st), with st+1 = 1, 2, ..., h. In other words, pst,st+1 denotes the proba-
bility of going from state st in the current period to state st+1 next period. This allows
us to define the expectation
EtAst+1xt+1 (•, st) ≡
h∑
st+1=1
pst,st+1Ast+1Etxt+1 (st+1, st) (6)
3.2 Solution and stability
Solving the type of systems above is not straightforward and the traditional solution
methods for constant-parameter DSGE models cannot be used. As can be seen from the
problem, the solution in each state will be a function of the solution in all other states and
vice-versa. To solve the system we rely on Newton methods developed in Maih (2012)
and which extend Farmer et al. (2011).
The Newton method in Maih (2012) concentrates on minimum state variable (MSV)
solutions of the form:
xt (st, st−1) = Tstxt−1 (st−1, st−2) +Rstεt (7)
The traditional stability concepts for constant-parameter linear rational expectations
models do not extend to the markov switching case. Following the lead of Svensson
and Williams (2005) and Farmer et al. (2011), we characterize stable solutions using the
concept of Mean Square Stability (MSS), borrowed from the engineering literature. See
for instance, Gupta et al. (2003) or Costa et al. (2005).
Consider the MSRE system whose solution is given by equation (7) and with transition
probability matrix Q. This system is MSS if for any initial condition x0, there exist
a vector µ and a matrix Σ independent of x0 such that limt−→∞ ‖Ext − µ‖ = 0 and
limt−→∞ ‖Extx′t − Σ‖ = 0. A necessary and sufficient condition for MSS is that matrix
Υ, has all its eigenvalues inside the unit circle.
Υ ≡ (Q⊗ In2×n2)
 T1 ⊗ T1 . . .
Th ⊗ Th

3.3 Estimation
In order to estimate the model, the likelihood has to be computed. Because of the presence
of unobserved variables and unobserved states of the Markov chains, the likelihood has to
be computed using a filtering procedure. The standard Kalman filter is not appropriate
in this case because the information up to time t includes all the history of the states
of the Markov chains. The most accurate filtering procedure should take into account
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all possible paths, which are multiplied by a factor of h (the number of states) at each
iteration. This is infeasible. Kim and Nelson (1999) propose an approximation that
makes filtering possible. Their strategy is to limit the number of states that are carried
forward at each iteration of the Kalman filter. This is done through an operation called
”collapse”, which, essentially, averages across states.
Even when carrying forward only a few states, this filtering procedure is still expen-
sive. Waggoner and Zha (2008)7 exploit Kim and Nelson’s idea and propose a variant in
which the collapse occurs right after the prediction step of the Kalman filter, rather than
right after the updating step as in Kim and Nelson (1999). The two approaches lead to
numerically similar results and the Waggoner-Zha approach, which we follow, achieves
those results with substantial computational savings. In both cases, the calculation of
the probabilities is done using the Hamilton (1994) filter.
For the smoothing step, we adapt the Durbin and Koopman (2012) smoother for constant-
parameter models. Our adaptation has the advantage of giving the same results as the
Kim and Nelson (1999) smoothing procedure and also allowing smoothing based on the
Waggoner-Zha filtering procedure.
The paper uses a Bayesian approach for estimating the models. In particular, we combine
the likelihood, described above, with the prior density of the parameters, thereby forming
the posterior kernel which we maximize to get the mode of the posterior distribution.
While the estimate of the mode represents the most likely value, it also serves as a
starting point for initializing the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedure aimed
at constructing the full posterior distribution and computing the marginal data density
(MDD).
Even for simple models as the one considered here, finding the mode is computationally
challenging given that the posterior kernel has many peaks. Our optimization strategy
is to use a stochastic grid search algorithm, which is derivative-free, to locate areas of
the parameter space in which the global peak may lie and then use a Newton-based
optimization procedure to climb to that peak.
4 Empirical implementation
We proceed with a discussion on the data, the choice of prior distribution for the Bayesian
analysis and a description of the choice of parameters that are allowed to switch. We also
discuss briefly the timing of policy changes that has actually taken place in history, such
as when the central banks adopted inflation targeting.
7See Zha (2011) for reference.
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4.1 Data
We use quarterly data for the period 1982:2-2011:4.8 For each country, there are seven
observable variables: domestic real GDP, inflation, nominal effective exchange rate, terms
of trade and short term interest rate, foreign output and inflation. In this respect, we
differ from Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) as they do not use foreign observables in their es-
timations. All data except the nominal interest rate and the exchange rate are seasonally
adjusted.
Output growth rates are computed as log differences of GDP and multiplied by 100
to convert them into quarter to quarter percentages. Inflation rates are defined as log
differences of the consumer price indices and multiplied by 400 to obtain annualised
percentage rates. We approximate foreign output and inflation based on US GDP and CPI
inflation respectively.9 We use the log differences (multiplied by 100) of the trade-weighted
nominal effective exchange rate to obtain depreciation rates.10 Percentage changes in the
terms of trade are computed as log differences and multiplied by 100 while the nominal
interest rate is measured in levels. All series are demeaned prior to analysis. For further
details on data and the sources, see Appendix A.
4.2 Choice of priors and Markov switches
The choice of prior distribution for the structural parameters are presented in Table 1
along with the estimated posterior mode for a model with constant regime as a bench-
mark. With the exception of the parameter α, we allow for loose priors to entertain the
idea that there has been multiple regime changes in the sample. α, which is the import
share, is tightly centered around 0.2, as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).
For each country, we will allow for four competing Markov switching models; Time in-
variant (constant) regime, markov switch in volatilities only, switch in parameters in the
policy rule only, and (independent) markov switch in volatility and parameters in the
monetary policy rule. With four countries this implies that we will estimate a total of 16
models.
In the model that allows for regime switching in the open economy interest rate rule,
we allow the parameters ρr, γpi, γy and γe to follow an independent two-state Markov
process, where we denote the low response regime as (coef, 1) and the high response
regime as (coef, 2). To compare systematically across countries, we normalize the high
response regime (coef, 2) to be the regime where the central bank responds strongly to
the exchange rate, i.e. γe(coef, 1) < γe(coef, 2).
In the model that allows for regime switching in the shocks, we let volatility of all struc-
tural and foreign shocks σr, σz, σy∗ , σpi∗ and σq to follow an independent two-state Markov
8The start date reflects data availability for the interest rate series in Sweden.
9As an alternative, we constructed a global index calculated from the principal component of the GDP
based on 27 different countries throughout the world. The results were robust to this change and can be
obtained at request.
10Note that for an increase to correspond to a depreciation rate, we invert the exchange rate.
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process, where we denote the low volatility regime as (vol, 1) and the high volatility
regime as (vol, 2). Again, to compare systematically across countries, we normalize the
high volatility regime (vol, 2) to be the regime where the volatility (in productivity) is
highest, i.e. σz(vol, 1) < σz(vol, 2)
4.3 Known policy changes - Inflation targeting
Before estimating the model, it is useful to acknowledge the periods of known policy
changes that has taken place, such as when the central banks switched from a regime of
exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting.
Canada adopted an inflation target in February 1991, but has changed the explicit target
and range several times since then. However, since the end of 1995, the target for the
annual rate of total consumer price inflation has been the 2 percent midpoint of a 1 to
3 per cent range. Until September 1998, the Bank of Canada intervened in the foreign
exchange market in a systematic and automatic fashion to avoid significant upward or
downward pressure on the Canadian dollar. Since September 1998, the policy has been
to intervene only in exceptional circumstances.
Sweden and the UK switched to inflation targeting in the early 1990s after currency crises
and the collapse of their fixed exchange rate regimes (to the ECU in the fall of 1992).
The countries have adhered to a policy of not intervening systematically in the foreign
exchange market since then.
In Norway, interventions to fix the exchange rate were abandoned in December 1992, and
the foreign exchange regime thereafter became more flexible. Monetary policy was still
oriented towards maintaining a stable exchange rate in relation to European currencies,
although without defining a central exchange rate with fluctuation margins that should
be defended by interventions. Eventually, in early 2001, a formal inflation targeting
framework was adopted. However, the new framework in Norway was not communicated
by policymakers as a regime change.11
We investigate whether empirical evidence of regime shifts and spurs of volatility can be
extracted from the data, given our model framework.
5 Results
We start by comparing the parameter estimates in a time invariant model for Canada
with the results in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) before turning to our preferred multiple
regime switching model.
11The Norwegian central bank Governor at the time, Svein Gjedrem, stated in a speech in the fall of 2001
that ”The new guidelines for monetary policy did not entail any significant change in the conduct of
monetary policy. Quantifying an inflation target, in line with international practice, has made it easier
to explain and understand Norwegian monetary policy.”, see Gjedrem (2001).
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5.1 Parameter estimates - Time invariant Rational Expectation
Model
The estimation result for the posterior mode, along with the prior mode distribution12
for Canada using a time invariant (constant) model is reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Canada: Constant model - Prior and posterior mode
Param Prior distr Prior prob low high mode mode std
τ Beta 0.9 0.17 0.83 0.62 1.81e-08
k Gamma 0.9 0.12 0.87 0.32 1.48e-08
α Beta 0.9 0.12 0.28 0.13 1.71e-08
ρq Beta 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.36 0.0090
ρy∗ beta 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.95 0.0009
ρpi∗ beta 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.41 0.0138
ρz Beta 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.49 0.0052
ρr Beta 0.9 0.05 0.948 0.89 0.0019
γpi Gamma 0.9 0.9 3 0.97 0.0001
γy Gamma 0.9 0.1 3 3.00 0.0001
γe Gamma 0.9 0.05 3 0.001 0.0001
σr InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.002 0.0002
σq InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.020 0.0011
σz InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.005 0.0005
σy∗ InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.005 0.0004
σpi∗ InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.019 0.0009
σy InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.002 0.0005
σpi InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.012 0.0009
The table suggests structural parameters that are broadly aligned with the model param-
eters reported in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), with the exception of the parameters on
the policy reaction function, which suggests a higher weight on output and lower weight
on the exchange rate. However, given that we allow for loose priors, include observable
foreign variables and use a longer sample (9 years of extra data including the financial
crisis at the end) this is not very surprising. In fact, we would argue that if the data are
generated by different distributions reflected by different regimes, forcing a time invariant
distribution to the data should potentially yield different results depending on the sample
analysed.
Finally, Table 2 displays the results for the coefficients on the policy function for the other
three countries (Norway, Sweden and the UK).13 The results suggest a very high weight
on the exchange rate in the policy reaction function in Norway, followed by Sweden, while
in the UK, there is no exchange rate response. The coefficients for output are high in
all countries, while the response to inflation varies from 0.4 in Norway to 1.4 in Sweden.
12”Prior prob” indicate the mass of prior distribution between ”low” and ”high” parameter choices.
13Results for the other parameters that are not switching can be obtained upon request.
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Table 2: Norway, Sweden and UK: Constant model - Policy parameters
Param Prior distr Prior prob low high Norway Sweden UK
ρ r Beta 0.9 0.05 0.948 0.94 0.88 0.86
γ pi Gamma 0.9 0.9 3 0.40 1.36 0.94
γ y Gamma 0.9 0.1 3 2.71 1.97 2.99
γ e Gamma 0.9 0.05 3 2.15 0.09 0.00
Hence, using a constant parameter model would lead us to conclude that there is virtually
no exchange rate response in Canada and the UK, while the responses in Sweden and in
particular in Norway, are more substantial. However, it is evidenced herein that there is a
more nuanced picture when we allow the parameters to switch between different regimes.
5.2 Parameter estimates - Switching policy rule and volatility
Table 3 displays for all countries the posterior mode of the estimated parameters in a
model with both switching volatility and policy responses. We find that the size of policy
responses, and the volatility of structural shocks, have not remained constant during the
sample period (1982 to 2011). For all countries, there is a substantial difference between
the high and low volatility regimes and between the high and low policy response regimes.
We begin by investigating the coefficients on the policy reaction function, ρr, γpi, γy and γe.
There is clear evidence that the central banks have responded strongly to the exchange
rate in the high response regime γe(coef, 2), while the response to inflation is highest in
the low response regime γpi(coef, 1). Interest rate smoothing is also more pronounced in
the low response regime, with the exception of Norway. The response to output varies
between the different countries, with Canada and the UK responding more strongly to
output also in the low response regime, while Norway and Sweden respond more strongly
to output in the high response regime.
Hence, the low response regime can be characterized by an interest rate rule that empha-
sises interest rate smoothing and high inflation response, while the high response regime
is characterized by high exchange rate response, and for Norway and Sweden, it is also
characterised by high output responses. Among the countries, we find Norway to have
the strongest interest rate response to the exchange rate, followed by Canada, Sweden
and the UK. The probability of moving from a low to a high response regime, is also
highest in Norway. For the other countries, the probability of moving from a high to a
low response regime is higher.
Regarding the Markov state processes for volatility, all shocks display the highest volatil-
ity in regime (vol, 2). However, in all countries, the probability of moving from a high
to a low volatility regime is greater than moving from a low to a high volatility regime.
Hence, all countries remain in the low volatility regime for most of the periods. Note
that Norway stands out from the other countries in two respects, though. Volatility of its
terms of trade is about six times higher (in the low volatility regime), see Table 3. This
is most likely due to the relative size of the petroleum sector in that country. In equation
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Table 3: Regime switches - Posterior mode
Param Prior distr Prior prob low high Canada Norway Sweden UK
τ Beta 0.9 0.17 0.83 0.93 0.48 0.78 0.58
k Gamma 0.9 0.12 0.87 0.57 1.09 0.14 0.05
α Beta 0.9 0.12 0.28 0.15 0.46 0.18 0.16
ρq Beta 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.25 0.97 0.06 0.04
ρy∗ Beta 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.96
ρpi∗ Beta 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.48 0.36 0.58 0.25
ρz Beta 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.50 0.79 0.63 0.44
ρr(coef, 1) Beta 0.9 0.05 0.95 0.93 0.07 0.95 0.94
ρr(coef, 2) Beta 0.9 0.05 0.95 0.76 0.97 0.10 0.67
γpi(coef, 1) Gamma 0.9 0.5 3 0.57 0.85 0.13 0.37
γpi(coef, 2) Gamma 0.9 0.5 3 0.48 0.51 0.12 0.35
γy(coef, 1) Gamma 0.9 0.1 3 3.41 2.11 2.00 3.69
γy(coef, 2) Gamma 0.9 0.1 3 1.91 2.94 3.15 0.77
γe(coef, 1) Gamma 0.9 0.05 3 0.10 0.001 0.001 0.001
γe(coef, 2) Gamma 0.9 0.25 3 0.11 4.069 0.061 0.080
σr(vol, 1) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001
σr(vol, 2) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.003
σq(vol, 1) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.012 0.064 0.010 0.009
σq(vol, 2) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.035 0.039 0.019 0.019
σz(vol, 1) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
σz(vol, 2) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.010
σy∗(vol, 1) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
σy∗(vol, 2) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.018 0.015 0.012 0.010
σpi∗(vol, 1) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.017 0.009 0.010 0.018
σpi∗(vol, 2) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.033 0.063 0.034 0.048
σy(vol, 1) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.002
σy(vol, 2) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.004
σpi(vol, 1) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.010 0.019 0.015 0.011
σpi(vol, 2) InvGam 0.9 0.005 1 0.030 0.008 0.039 0.020
coef tp 1 2 Beta 0.9 0.001 0.3 0.005 0.111 0.005 0.005
coef tp 2 1 Beta 0.9 0.001 0.3 0.010 0.010 0.018 0.017
vol tp 1 2 Beta 0.9 0.001 0.3 0.027 0.005 0.027 0.055
vol tp 2 1 Beta 0.9 0.001 0.3 0.164 0.111 0.165 0.253
(3), we impose relative purchasing power parity, with domestic inflation being the only
endogenous variable. Output variance is also much higher in Norway than in the other
countries - 2-3 times higher, which is again most likely due to the size of the petroleum
sector.
With respect to the other structural parameters (that are not switching), three features
should be noted. First, the parameter α that measures the degree of openness, is esti-
mated to be largest in Norway, followed by Sweden, the UK and Canada. Hence, Norway
is the most open country. Second, the parameter κ which measures the slope coefficient
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Figure 1: Smoothed probabilities - Canada
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Note: The upper row displays the smoothed probabilities of being in a high policy response regime (coef, 2)
and the bottom row shows the probability of being in a high volatility regime (vol, 2).
in the Phillips curve is estimated to be below one in all countries but Norway, where it
is just above one. A high value for κ may relate to the fact that the output gap is also
linked to foreign output, via the perfect risk-sharing assumption, thus implying that κ in
our model reflects shocks to foreign output in addition to domestic productivity. Given
that Norway is the most open of these countries, a high κ may also be reasonable. Third,
the parameter τ , which measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is highest
in Canada. With a high elasticity, movements in foreign output does not contribute to
the output gap, via the perfect risk-sharing condition. Furthermore, foreign output is
dropped from the IS equation. As our measure for foreign output is US GDP growth,
which may be closely correlated with Canadian output, foreign output may not give too
much additional information regarding the Canadian case.
Figures 1,2, 3 and 4 display the smoothed probabilities in Canada, Norway, Sweden and
the UK respectively. Each figure displays in the upper row the smoothed probabilities of
being in a high policy response regime (coef, 2) and in the bottom row, the probability
of being in a high volatility regime (vol, 2).
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Figure 2: Smoothed probabilities - Norway
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Note: See notes to Figure Figure 1 above.
The figures emphasise that the central banks in Sweden and the UK switched from
primarily responding to the exchange rate in the 1980s, to responding more to inflation
shortly after inflation targeting was implemented in the early 1990s. Canada also switched
from a high to a low response regime throughout the sample, but the switch occurred a
few years later, in 1997/1998, which corresponds to the time when the Bank of Canada
stopped intervening systematically in the foreign exchange market, see the discussion in
Section 4.3 and in Lama and Medina (2012).14 Note, however, that the Central Bank in
Canada still responds to the exchange rate, but the response has declined relative to the
response in inflation and output, see Table 3.
The results for Norway are different. With the exception of the brief period in 1992/1993,
the central bank has responded strongly to the exchange rate both prior and post im-
plementing inflation targeting (in 2001). This regime also involves high output response.
14Canada also targeted the exchange rate indirectly during periods in the 1990s by developing a monetary
condition index (MCI) that encompasses both interest rate and exchange rate information as a more
comprehensive indicator of the monetary stance.
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Figure 3: Smoothed probabilities - Sweden
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Note: See notes to Figure Figure 1 above.
In 1992/1993 Norway stopped intervening in the foreign exchange market to defend the
fixed exchange rate regime, and exited the strict exchange rate peg. This is being picked
up as a regime switch by the data, and for 1-2 years, there is virtually no exchange rate
response. The year after, the policy rule in Norway is again best described by a high
response to the exchange rate (as well as a concern for output stabilisation).
Why is there no decline in the exchange rate response? First, and as discussed herein,
of the countries analysed here, Norway adopted inflation targeting last. In doing so,
policymakers also stressed that the new guidelines for monetary policy did not entail any
significant change in the conduct of monetary policy, see Gjedrem (2001), and develop-
ment in the exchange rate are still regularly discussed in the monetary policy reports.15
15Today Norges Bank communicates its policy intentions using forward guidance for the interest rate, and
the analysis behind the interest rate path is based on optimal policy and on an ad hoc loss function,
rather than on an interest rate rule. The exchange rate is not an argument of the (ad-hoc) loss function
that the central bank of Norway refers to, though one would expect that optimal policy could involve
some response to the exchange rate to the extent that the exchange rate affects inflation, output or other
targets.
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Figure 4: Smoothed probabilities - UK
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Note: See notes to Figure Figure 1 above.
Second, note that the persistence of the interest rate is very high in the Norwegian high-
response regime, and very low in the other regime, see Table 3. Hence, one interpretation
of the data is that as the flexible exchange rate regime was visited in 1992/1993, the
interest rate was established at a new and lower level. Indeed, as the peg was abandoned
in 1992, there was only a limited depreciation of the exchange rate, which stands in some
contrast to the Swedish experience as the Swedish krone depreciated sharply in the fall
of 1992. Viewed in this way, the Norwegian case is somewhat similar to the Canadian
case, with a fairly high exchange rate response in the interest rate both before and after
authorities stopped intervening to peg the exchange rate. In all countries, the interest
rate has stayed - or become more, persistent in the regimes that have been in place in
the latter part of our sample period.
Turning to the lower panel of Figures 1,2, 3 and 4, there is a striking similarity in the
timing of the switch between the high and low volatility regimes, although the weights
in the policy rule vary from country to country. In particular, independent of the chosen
policy rules, the probability of remaining in a regime of low volatility was high from the
16
middle 1990s until 2004/2005 (the period often referred to a ’the Great Moderation’).
There is also a high probability of staying in a high volatility regime during the period of
the financial crisis in all countries. The period where the countries vary the most, is in
the 1980s when Sweden and the UK experienced high volatility. Interestingly, these are
also the two countries that first switched from a regime of high exchange rate response.
How do our results compare to the findings in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007)? Estimating
a DSGE model with time invariant parameters, they find that the interest rate increases
systematically following an exchange rate depreciation in all countries, but with Canada
and the UK responding the most. Similar results (with the possible exception of the UK)
are also found in Bjørnland (2009) and Bjørnland and Halvorsen (2013), estimating a
structural VAR model with constant parameters.16 However, when we allow for regime
switches, we find that in Canada, Sweden and the UK, the response to the exchange
rate was substantial early in the sample but declined sharply in the period after inflation
targeting was implemented (with Canada observing the switch the latest). Hence, our
results for Canada and UK modify the findings in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), For
Canada, our findings suggest that the central bank still responds to the exchange rate,
but the response has declined relative to that of inflation and output.
Why would some countries still respond to the exchange rate in an inflation targeting
regime? What we observe is most likely that central banks, under inflation targeting,
allow the interest rate to respond to the exchange rate to the extent that it is considered
important for achieving the inflation target. This may differ from country to country. It
is interesting to observe, though, that the two resource rich countries are the countries
that observe the highest response to the exchange rate, both in the high- and the low
response regimes.
Finally, it should be noted that exchange rate targeting regimes that were in place in the
countries studied herein involved targeting the dollar and the European currency unit.
To the extent that such targeting was successful, there would still be movements in the
nominal effective exchange rate. Given this, the identification of different regimes is all
the more striking.
6 Robustness - Alternative regime switches
Our regime switching model suggests a reasonable picture of policy switches and spurs
of volatility consistent with historical experience and information available from speeches
and publication from the relevant Central Banks. However, to evaluate if the regime
switching model gives an accurate description of the data, we could use a statistical
criteria. Table 4 do this by comparing the log Marginal Data Density (MDD) Laplace
approximation for the constant model with three alterative regime switching models; a
model with switches in the parameters only, a model with switches in volatility only and
16The SVAR models are identified with sign or long-run neutrality restrictions such that the monetary
policy and the exchange rate can respond instantaneously to news.
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Table 4: Model comparison - Log MDD (Laplace)
Canada Norway Sweden UK
Constant parameter model 2484 2240 2497 2525
Parameter only 2553 2218 2519 2505
Volatility only 2488 2257 2531 2550
Parameter and volatility 2561 2252 2534 2533
Table 5: Prior and poster mode, volatility only
Param Prior distr Prior prob low high Canada Norway Sweden UK
ρ r beta 0.9 0.05 0.948 0.87 0.95 0.90 0.90
γ pi gamma 0.9 0.9 3 0.86 0.36 1.25 0.98
γ y gamma 0.9 0.1 3 2.99 1.48 1.00 2.99
γ e gamma 0.9 0.05 3 0.12 2.34 0.20 0.00
our chosen model with switches in volatility and parameters only.17
The results suggest that a model that allows for switches in both policy parameters and
volatility is preferred to a constant parameter model in all countries. However, for two of
the countries; Norway and the UK, a model that allows for switches in volatility (only)
is marginally preferred to the model that allows for switches on both parameters and
volatility. For Norway, this may come at no surprise, as Norway has been in a regime of
high policy response throughout most of the sample period. Hence, a model that only
allow for switches in volatility may capture well the Norwegian policy response. UK, on
the other hand, had the lowest policy response of the countries analyzed here, and the
period in which it responded to the exchange rate ended early in the sample. This could
explain why the model which only allows for a switch in volatility is marginally favoured
to a model with which allow for switches in both policy parameters and volatility.
What would the results have been if we had treated the policy parameters as constant,
that is, only allowed for a switch in volatility? Table 5 displays the coefficients in the
policy rule for all countries assuming a model that only allows for switches in volatility,
while Figure 5 display the smoothed probabilities of being in a regime of (only) high
volatility for all the countries. Both are displayed in Appendix B.
Table 5 confirms again that Norway responds the most to the exchange rate, followed
by Sweden, Canada and the UK (that now has zero response like in the constant regime
model). Figure 5 suggests that the model now interprets the period of known policy
changes as spurs of high volatility instead, see in particular the the plots for Norway and
the UK. As we know there was a formal policy switch away from fixed exchange rate
regimes (characterised with interventions) to a more flexible regime, we believe our core
model, that allows for switches in both policy response and volatility, provides a more
accurate description of how the monetary policymakers have responded to exchange rate
17Because the likelihood we work with is only approximate, we use the laplace approximation to the
posterior distribution, see Christiano et al. (2011) for details on computation.
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fluctuations over the sample analysed.
7 Conclusion
We analyse whether central banks in small open economies respond to the exchange rate.
Using a Markov switching DSGE model that explicitly allow for parameter changes, we
observe that the size of policy responses and the volatility of structural shocks, have not
remained constant during the sample period (1982-2011).
In particular, central banks in Sweden and the UK switched from primarily responding to
the exchange rate (and output) in the 1980s to inflation shortly after inflation targeting
was implemented in the early 1990s. Canada also observed a regime switch, but the switch
came a few years later, in 1997/1998. However, the decline in exchange rate response was
relative to an increase in responding to inflation and output.
Such a decline in exchange rate response over time has not been observed in Norway,
where the central bank has responded strongly to the exchange rate before and after
implementing inflation targeting.
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Appendices
Appendix A Data and sources
We use the trade-weighted nominal effective exchange rate, NEER, from the IMFs IFS
database for all countries. Note that in order to make an increase correspond to a
depreciation rate, we invert the NEER. For the other series, we use the following:
Canada:
Terms of trade data are from the OECD Economic Outlook.
The short term interest rate is the average 3-Month Treasury Bill Yield from the Bank
of Canada.
The CPI is from OECD MEI. We have seasonally adjusted it.
Real GDP is from Statistics Canada, SA.
Norway
Terms of trade data are from Statistics Norway, SA.
The interest rate is three month NIBOR interest rate, Norges Bank.
CPI is from Statistics Norway, SA.
Real GDP data is from Statistics Norway, SA.
Sweden
Terms of trade data are from Statistics Sweden, SA.
The short term rate is average quarterly short term rate from the Swedish Riksbank from
1982.
The CPI data is from Statistics Sweden, SA.
Real GDP is from OECD MEI, we have seasonally adjusted it.
United Kingdom
Terms of trade data are from the Office for National Statistics, SA
The interest rate is the three month interbank rate taken from OECD MEI [OECD MEI’GBR.IR3TIB01.ST.Q.]
The CPI is from OECD MEI [GBR.CPALTT01.IXOB.Q]. We have seasonally adjusted
it.
Real GDP data is from the Office for National Statistics, SA
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Foreign GDP and Inflation
for the foreign variables, we use US data.
Real GDP is U.S.: Gross Domestic Product (SAAR, Bil.Chn.2005$), from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, S.A.
The CPI is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, SA.
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Appendix B Extra figures
Figure 5: Smoothed probabilities, high volatility
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Note: The figures display the smoothed probabilities of being in a high volatility regime (vol, 2).
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